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PEOPLE EX REL. GENERAL MOTORS v. BUA:
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS -

THE PROBLEM

OF OVERKILL
Plaintiffs filed a personal injury suit on October 10, 1963
against General Motors Corporation, who had manufactured the
1961 Corvair automobile in which they were riding when injured, and McBroom Motor Company, for injuries sustained in
an accident allegedly caused by a defective tie rod in the automobile. General Motors was charged with being negligent in both
the design and manufacture of the car and as having breached
its various warranties of general fitness for purpose. McBroom
Motor Company was charged with being careless and negligent
in selling plaintiffs an automobile when it was in a dangerous
condition for use and in failing to make a reasonable inspection
to determine the condition of the Corvair. McBroom was also
charged with breach of various warranties, both express and
implied.'
In the ensuing year, interrogatories were answered by the
defendants, certain records were produced and other discovery
was sought and obtained by all the parties. In January 1965,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint containing the original allegations concerning the tie rod and warranties, and, in addition,
allegations further challenging the propriety and safety of the
2
Corvair's design.

After receiving answers to interrogatories posed to the
plaintiffs, General Motors filed its answer denying the allegations of negligence and the existence of any warranties or breach
thereof. Plaintiffs then initiated discovery on their amended
complaint by serving a notice on April 23, 1965, for the taking
of the evidence depositions, on May 10, of 12 engineers and executives of General Motors. Contemporaneously, the plaintiffs
sought an order directing General Motors to produce at the same
time and place, certain records, documents, and drawings for
inspection by representatives of the plaintiffs. On April 27 the
trial judge entered an order for production of all the material
sought by plaintiffs. The order provided that the material was
1 This note concerns only General Motors' role in the litigation.

Any

reference to the "defendant" appearing in the text relates only to General
Motors, unless otherwise indicated.
2

The specific contention was that "the automobile's swing action rear

suspension system and its rear engine placement and consequent center of
gravity made the car highly unstable and likely to go out of control in normal use." Brief for respondent Bua at 6, People ex rel. General Motors
Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
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to be produced by defendants on May 10, 1965, at defendant's
3
place of business in Detroit.
On May 10, however, the order was modified to require the
production on the following day of the same material that was
already being prepared for discovery in a pending Florida suit
against defendant. There was considerable fencing between
plaintiffs' and defendant's counsel in Detroit as to whether
plaintiffs' counsel had the authority to examine the documents
3 Brief for respondent Bua at Appendix A. The order required:
ITIhat the defendant General Motors Corporation and its officers and
agents produce at the offices of the said defendant in the General Motors
Building in Detroit, Michigan, on Monday, May 10, 1965, at 9:30 A.M.,
each and all of the following records, documents, and drawings and that
said defendant then and there permit the representatives of the plaintiffs
in this action to inspect and copy the said records and documents at said
time and place; and it is further ordered that the said defendant have
each and all of the said records present and available for use by counsel
for the parties hereto at the place of and during the taking of depositions
of employees of the said General Motors Corporation in the above entitled cause in Detroit, Michigan, commencing on Monday, May 10, 1965,
at 9:30 A.M. The said records, which the defendant is hereby ordered to
produce, include all engineering plans, specifications, blueprints, memoranda, written reports, reports of laboratory and proving ground tests,
and all other records, papers, moving pictures and documents which show
as to model years of the Corvair 1960 through 1965:
1. The preliminary work, studies, and tests in the designing, development and manufacture of the Corvair automobile.
2. The blueprints of the Corvair automobile showing the wheels,
axles, drive shaft and steering control apparatus, and the suspension system of said car.
3. The weight and weight distribution of said car, the location of
the engine with relation to the rear axle, the amount of weight
on the rear wheels of said automobile, the amount of weight on
the front wheels of said automobile, and on each wheel and tire
of said Corvair, and the center of gravity of said cars.
4. The amount of camber in the rear axle and the rear wheels of
said automobile, caster, and slip angle characteristics, and the
amount of toe-in oversteer and understeer of said car under various conditions, the type of suspension system in use on said
car, the amount of movement and rebound of the body of said car
on its suspension system at the rear and front end of said car,
and the PPI in the front and rear springs of said Corvair cars.
5. All tests made by test drivers for General Motors Corporation
on said Corvair automobile prior to the occurrence in question,
in which the plaintiffs were injured, showing the function and
performance of the said automobile, its roadability, its stability,
its road holding ability, and other characteristics of the operation
and function of said car under various road and weather conditions.
6. The specifications of the tires used on said Corvair automobile,
the performance of said tires on said car under various road conditions, the amount of air pressure to be carried or used in the
tires of the said automobile, hot and cold, and the reasons for
such pressures.
7. The wind tests, whether simulated or actual, conducted on said
Corvair automobiles, and the center of wind pressure on said
cars.
8. All tests to determine the type of front and rear suspension systems for said Corvair automobiles.
9. All bulletins, notices, pamphlets and other written material
disseminated by General Motors Corporation to its dealers,
service stations, and to the public regarding the maintenance and
servicing of the Corvair automobiles.
Id. at 1.
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at the same time as the Florida counsel and thus only limited
discovery was obtained.
Subsequently, at a hearing on May 13, there were charges
and countercharges concerning what had transpired in Detroit
on May 11. General Motors filed an affidavit by one of its staff
attorneys showing that it would take several months to collect
and produce all the records called for in the original order of
April 27. Plaintiff filed two motions, the first requesting the
production of some additional data, and the second requesting
a default judgment against General Motors, or alternatively,
that defendant, because of its conduct on that day, pay the costs
of the trip to Detroit on May 11 and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs' motion to default General Motors was continued and set
for a later hearing. However, over the objection of the defendant that it would be impossible to collect the requested documents since their descriptions were too vague and nebulous, the
court at this time did grant the. plaintiffs' motion for the
production of 'additional data on May 17.
In the days following the May 13 hearing, the charges and
countercharges of misconduct by respective counsel at the Detroit proceedings were reiterated and further orders were entered by the court,4 all of which culminated in a June 10 hearing
on plaintiffs' second motion to enter a ruling against defendant
to show cause why its answer should not be stricken, and why
defendant should not be defaulted for its wilful refusal to comply with the discovery orders. At the next hearing on June 29,
the trial court entered an order adjudicating General Motors to
be in contempt of court, and granted the relief sought by the
plaintiffs' motion. On the preceding day, June 28, the defendant had filed a motion in the Illinois Supreme Court asking
leave to file a petition for an extraordinary writ of mandamus
or prohibition directed to the orders of April 27 and May 13.
Thus, in its adjudication of contempt, on June 29, the court,
while entering a default order which struck the defendant's answer and found for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, deferred
4 On May 28 an order was entered for the taking of depositions by the

plaintiff and the production of the documents called for inprior orders of
the court. An order entered on June 2 requiring General Motors to turn
over to the plaintiffs three copies of each document required by the May 28
order with certain exceptions, or alternatively, the originals of those docu-

ments for copying by the plaintiff. This order of June 2 also required defendant to have certain employees available for interrogation under oath
concerning the documents.

On June 10, an order was entered directing the

plaintiffs to retain possession of any documents already furnished by the
defendant and directing the defendants to turn over to plaintiffs all docu-

ments previously requested in triplicate, or alternatively, the originals for

copying. This June 10 order further provided for the production of proving

ground tests and for the taking of depositions concerning these tests imme-

diately and disallowed defendant's motion to postpone evidentiary deposi-

tions until plaintiffs' representatives had examined all the records.
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trial on the issue of damages until the final disposition of the
defendant's petition for the extraordinary writ. The defendant
thereupon filed its appeal from the trial court's contempt and
default adjudication of June 29. Subsequently, the supreme

court consolidated the two cases arising from the proceedings
below, granted a writ of mandamus, and struck the discovery
orders entered by the trial judge as being too broad and therefore constituting an abuse of discretion.
INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Supreme Court here retained jurisdiction and

reviewed the pretrial discovery order even though the court admitted that in neither of the two causes was there any traditional
basis for invoking its jurisdiction. The contempt order, while
appearing to be a reviewable order, did not meet the require6
ment of finality to be appealable and was accordingly dismissed.
The court agreed that mandamus is normally not an appropriate

means to review or regulate discovery in the trial court. However, in its view, the questions presented by this appeal were of
such "extraordinary importance ' 7 to warrant an exception and
5People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 184, 191,

226 N.E.2d 6, 9, 13 (1967).
6 Id. at 191, 226 N.E.2d at 13. The court concludes that the order was
not final and appealable "since it determines liability in the principal case
without a determination of damages." Id. In support of this proposition
the court cited Davis v. Childers, 33 Ill.2d. 297, 211 N.E.2d 364 (1965). The
Davis case, however, -did not actually involve an interpretation of Rule 1912(3) - currently ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219
(1967) but rather, a construction of §50(2) of the Civil Practice Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, §50(2) (1965) - currently ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, §304 (1967). It appears that the Davis case merely supports
this proposition inferentially. However, the law is well settled and is supported by substantial case authority, e.g., Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13
Ill.2d 45; 147,N.E.2d 371 (1958), which sets forth the criteria for a final
judgment:
To be final and appealable, a judgment or order must terminate the
litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so that, if
affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with the execution of judgment. .

.

. While the order need not dispose of all the issues presented

by the pleadings, it must be final in the sense that it disposes of the
rights of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or upon some
definite and separate part thereof.
Id. at 48, 147 N.E.2d at 372. See also Peach v. Peach, 73 Ill. App. 2d 72,
218 N.E.2d 504 (1966).
7The court exercised its discretion under former rule 28-1 (E), to hear
this case as one of "extraordinary importance where immediate decision is
necessary." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.28-1(E) (1965). ILL. SUP. CT. R.
302(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §302(d) (1967) replaced (former) Rule
28-1(E). In support of this decision,. the court cited the case of Berk v.
Will, 34 Ill.2d 588, 218 N.E.2d 98 (1966). That case involved the housing
facilitiesof local government in a populous city and had to be decided before
those officials were literally "put out on the street." It is evident that this
would be a case of "extraordinary importance." It is interesting to note that
Rule 28-1 (E) appears to deal solely with appeals which are originally docketed in the appellate court, and the Bua case was never in the appellate court.
Further, Rule 28-1(E) would appear not to apply in a mandamus action
such as Bua. Thus, it might be concluded that where a case is of "extraordinary importance," the court will not concern itself with formal requirements,
but rather will seek to hear the case on the merits.
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thus the court, exercising its supervisory powers over trial

courts, granted the writ.
USE OF MANDAMUS To REVIEW INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
By granting a writ of mandamus in this case, apparently
the court has accepted the theory that a court should allow a

form of interlocutory appeal where irreparable injury would
otherwise occur.,
The use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus as a
method to review interlocutory orders has left the courts in general disagreement as to when such a writ should properly issue.'
The Illinois Constitution grants the supreme court the authority
to exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating to mandamus.10

This grant of power, however, has not been construed to confer
general jurisdiction, but is limited to cases where the rights, interests or franchises of the state are involved or to emergency

cases involving local public interests or private rights." Whether
the facts of a particular case are sufficient to bring it within the
original mandamus jurisdiction of the supreme court is a matter
within the discretionary power of the court itself. The Illinois
Supreme Court has consistently held that mandamus would not
lie to review or modify an order where the trial court had acted

within its powers.' 2

No matter, how manifest the error, the

proper remedy was always by way of appeal. 13 Furthermore, the
8 This note is concerned with interlocutory appeals other than those
specifically authorized by (former) Rule 31, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §101.31
(1965) - currently embodied in ILL. SUP. CT. R. 307, 308, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, §§307, 308 (1967).
1 Some courts have held that mandamus does not lie to review a decision
of a lower court, whether the decision is interlocutory or final, where that
decision is subject to review on appeal, e.g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S.
9 (1926) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). This is so
even though resort to appellate procedure is clearly inadequate. Ex parte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947). Also, some courts feel that the writ's issuance
should never be justified solely on the ground that review of erroneous
interlocutory orders on appeal from a final judgment causes unnecessary
delay, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
However, the recent trend is away from these traditional limitations. The
traditional view that mandamus would not lie to control discretion of the
inferior courts, 35 AM. JUR. Mandamus §258 (1941), is not as rigidly followed today. See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 Haav. L. REv.
940, 996 (1961) which notes:
Many state courts have permitted the use of the alternative writs
of mandamus and prohibition to secure interlocutory review of discovery
orders, generally on the ground that the discretionary writs will lie if
the remedy by appeal would be ineffective to protect the petitioner from
the trial court's abuse of discretion.
Cf. Comment, Appellate Review of §1404(a) Orders - Misuse of an Extraordinary
Writ, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. __ (1968).
0
' ILL. CONST. art. 6, §5 (1870).

"I See People ex rel. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Donovan, 30 Ill.2d
178, 195 N.E.2d 634 (1964) ; People v. City of Chicago, 193 Ill. 507, 62 N.E.
179 (1901). See generally 4 DEPAuL L. REv. 279 (1955).
12 E.g., People ex rel. Atchison Topeka & Sante Fe R.R. v. Clark,
12 Ill.2d 515, 147 N.E.2d 89 (1958).
18 Id. at 520, 147 N.E.2d at 93.
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Illinois policy against piecemeal appeals,I 4 except where expressly
provided by statute, 15 would seem to reinforce the proposition that

mandamus should not lie to review interlocutory discovery orders.1 6
The prevailing judicial climate in Illinois is illustrated by
17
People ex rel. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. V. Clark,'

which held that mandamus would not lie to review a ruling by
the trial court on a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non

conveniens.18 In this case, the court said:
[I]t is not the office of the writ of mandamus to review the orders,
judgments, or decrees of courts for error in their rendition or to
correct, direct, or control the action of a judge in any matter which
he has jurisdiction to decide. For mere error, however gross or
manifest, the remedy is an appeal or writ of error, and the writ of
mandamus will not lie for its correction if the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.' 9
14 Ariola v. Nigro, 13 Ill.2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §78(1) (1963) was the former interlocutory
appeal statute. This statute was replaced by Rule 31 of the Illinois Supreme
Court, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.31 - currently ILL. SuP. CT. R. 307,
308, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§307, 308 (1967). Paragraph (1) states
the classes of interlocutory orders which are appealable but nowhere are
pre-trial discovery orders included.
16 But see People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d
780 (1957) ; People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588
(1957). These two cases, cited by the Bua court, were cases in which the
appellant sought to have a trial judge's discovery order reviewed by means of
mandamus. In the Noren case, the judge had entered an order for the
plaintiff to submit to a physical examination in a personal injury action, and
the supreme court, while denying the writ, did not discuss the question of
whether mandamus was the proper method to gain review of this pre-trial
discovery order. In the Terry case the defendant sought to have the trial
judge compelled to expunge from the record certain orders requiring the
defendant to answer discovery interrogatories concerning the existence and
amount of his liability insurance. The supreme court again denied the writ
and again did not discuss its propriety.
The Bua court also cites the case of People ex rel. Prince v. Graber, 397
Ill. 522, 74 N.E.2d 865 (1947) as a case falling within this area. The court
there did grant a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to expunge from
the record certain orders relating to the taking of an oral deposition of an
out-of-state plaintiff who had filed suit in Illinois. While mandamus was
not discussed as such and the writ was awarded to expunge the order, it
should be noted that the supreme court considered the order to have exceeded
the trial court's jurisdiction, stating:
Jurisdiction of the person of relator was not for the purpose of
forcing him to do anything, and the attempt to force him to give his
pretrial deposition before a notary public in Chicago, by an erroneous
order which was beyond the power of the court to enter, exceeded the
jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at 528, 74 N.E.2d at 866.
17 12 Ill.2d 515, 147 N.E.2d 89 (1958).
is Id. at 523, 147 N.E.2d at 94. But see People ex rel. Chesapeake &
Ohio R.R. v. Donovan, 30 Ill.2d 178, 195 N.E.2d 634 (1964).
19 People ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Clark, 12 Ill.2d
515, 520, 147 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1958). Accord, People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusher,
411 Ill. 535, 104 N.E.2d 775 (1952) where the court clearly states:
Mandamus can be invoked to expunge a judgment only when the judgment complained of is void for want of jurisdiction either of the subject
matter, of the parties, or to enter the order complained of ....
Moreover, although mandamus will lie to compel the performance
of ministerial acts of courts, . .. . mandamus will not lie to direct or

modify the exercise of judicial discretion by a judge.
Id. at 538, 104 N.E.2d at 777.
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Although the Illinois Supreme Court had previously followed
this policy regarding mandamus, apparently it has now adopted
the view that Illinois courts should allow review of interlocutory
orders under this writ where an appeal is not an adequate
remedy. The proponents of this argument contend that litigants would suffer if they were limited to an appeal only after
all the issues and rights of the parties had been determined, and
after punitive actions had been taken. It has been argued:
[W]hen discovery is erroneously ordered over a valid objection...
if the improperly discovered information is actually introduced at
trial and is prejudicial, this error can be urged on appeal from the
final judgment and the evidence excluded if a new trial is ordered.
In many cases, however, the value of discovery is not the direct
production of admissible [sic] evidence but the acquisition of information which may lead to evidence from other sources. Thus, the
discovered information will frequently not be introduced at the trial.
Since the information cannot be erased from the discovering party's mind, compliance with the discovery order renders the question
of its correctness moot. Incapable of providing any reasonable
remedy for the error, an appellate court would deny review from
the final judgment. In such a case, only an interlocutory appeal0
can provide an effective review of an order compelling discovery.2
Significantly, the federal courts, although having a policy
against piecemeal appeals and a final judgment rule, 21 have allowed mandamus to review interlocutory orders of the trial
court. 22 In LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 23 the United States
Supreme Court recognized such an exception to the traditional
limitations upon the use of mandamus. In LaBuy, a trial judge
improperly referred two non-jury, anti-trust cases to a master
for the determination of the issues of liability and damage as
well as the issue of the propriety of injunctive relief. The court
of appeals issued a writ of mandamus, requiring the district
24
judge to vacate his'order of reference as an abuse of discretion.
The United States Supreme Court approved the issuance of the
writ.25 The Supreme Court apparently regarded correction of the
trial court's order a proper use of mandamus to avoid the necessity of retrial after an eventual reversal of the final judgment
on appeal.26 By so doing, it would seem that the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of granting interlocutory relief in
cases of genuine necessity.
20Developments in the Law -

(1961).
21

Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 994

See Sears, Roebuck & Co..v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) ; Cold Metal

Process
Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956).
22
E.g., LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
23352
U.S. 249 (1957).
24
1d. at 251.
251d. at 260.

26 For a good history of the use of mandamus in the federal system see
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) and American Express Warehousing Ltd. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).

See also 1957 ILL. L. FOR. 159 and Comment, Mandamus and the Final
Decision Rule, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 709 (1963).
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The Bua case appears to be analogous to those cases considered under the federal mandamus approach.2 If General Mo-

tors did comply with the trial court's orders and tested their
validity through normal channels of appeal, this would offer the
defendant a "pyrrhic victory" at best. 28 If the Illinois Supreme

Court in Bua had refused to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction,
General Motors not only would have been put to a great deal of
expense, suffering business disruption and possible violation of
its trade secrets in an effort to comply with the trial court orders
of April 27 and May 10, but also, if General Motors chose to disobey the orders, it would have been exposed to the risk of losing

its right to defend on the merits, as the subsequent contempt
order of June 2929 demonstrates. Further, the order of May 10,
which measured the discovery permitted the Bua plaintiffs by
that granted to the plaintiffs in the Florida litigation,s ° raised the

possibility that the Illinois action was being controlled in part
by the court of another state.2 1 Thus, the nature of the peculiar
circumstances supported, and, in fact, compelled the issuance of

the writ.
However, it is important to note that in granting mandamus
the court pointed out that, "[i]n so doing we wish to give no
encouragement to the litigant who would have us review normal
pretrial discovery procedure by original mandamus. ' 1 2 It is apparent from this language that while the court chose to hear
this particular case, its jurisdiction would not always be availa-

ble to a litigant who feels that he might be injured by a pretrial discovery order.2

s

See notes 22 and 26 supra.
28 Defendant's Petition for Rehearing at 21-2, People ex rel. General
Motors
29 v. Bua, 37 I11.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
See text at notes 4-5 supra.
20 See text following note 3 supra.
31 Part of the discovery orders attacked in this case provided that discovery be permitted to the same extent as that being sought by other plaintiffs in a pending Florida case involving a 1961 Corvair automobile. Bua
at 187, 226 N.E.2d at 11. The Bua court struck down that part of the
order on the ground that it raised the "possibility that an Illinois action
could be in part controlled by the court of another State." Id. at 193, 226
N.E.2d at 14. In support of this position, the court cited James v. Grand
Trunk Western R.R., 14 Ill.2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958). The James
case held, inter alia, that a venue statute of the state of Michigan cannot
be invoked to control the prosecution of a wrongful death action in Illinois
where the Illinois court rightfully acquires jurisdiction of the case as being
a transitory action. However, the Bua court stated:
We do not say that defendant could not have waived our rules of discovery and privilege by stipulating or agreeing that the same matter
would be produced in both the Illinois and Florida .cases. What we say
is that such a procedure cannot be thrust upon the defendant as it was
in this case.
Bua at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
22 Bua at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
83On January 1, 1967 the new supreme court rules became effective.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 308, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §308 (1967) is a new rule,
27
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Finding that this was a proper case over which to exercise
jurisdiction, the court next proceeded to examine the trial court's
discovery orders.
PRODUCTION OF COMPLETE RECORDS RELEVANCY AND MATERIALITY

The Illinois Supreme Court, in Bua, found the discovery orders, which required the production of the complete records of
General Motors covering an extended period of time,3 4 without
a preliminary showing of relevancy and materiality to be an
abuse of the trial court's discretion. 5 In arriving at this conclusion, the court seems to emphasize the fact that plaintiff
sought post-accident records whose relevancy were not established. However, examination of the record and briefs of counsel shows that the plaintiffs in fact did establish at the trial level
the relevancy of the post-accident records. 3
It also appears
from these briefs that the defendant objected more to the allinclusive nature of the language of the order than to the nature
3 7

of the records being sought.

Nevertheless, the court did hold that where the records
sought are voluminous and there is a question as to their relemodeled after 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1964) as adopted in 1958. In paragraph
(a), Rule 308 states that:
When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not otherwise
appealable, finds that the order involves a question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, the court shall so state in writing, identifying the question of law involved. Such a statement may be made at
the time of the entry of the order or thereafter on the court's own
motion or on the motion of any party. The Appellate Court may thereupon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.
At first glance, this rule appears to solve the problem presented in the
principal case. However, it is worthy to note that in order to achieve an
appeal under this rule, both the trial court and the appellate court must
agree that an appeal will expedite the disposition of the litigation, and also
that there is a substantial question of law to be decided. See Committee
Comments on Rule 308, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §308 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1967).
34See note 3 supra.
85
Bua at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 14 (1967).
86 Specifically, Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at 15-19, People ex rel.
General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967). In Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing, id. at 15, the plaintiffs set out an affidavit, filed
early in the proceeding, which explained the relevancy of the post-accident
documents. The plaintiffs' argument on this point was based on the fact
that there is a long "lead time" from the time when models are being designed until those models go into production. The drawings for the 1965
Corvair sought to be discovered by the plaintiffs had been started as early
as 1962. Thus, plaintiffs reasoned, the tests on the 1965 Corvair might
have revealed the cause of the defect complained of through General Motors' attempt to correct it in later model Corvairs.
37 Brief for Defendant at 46-48, People ex 'el. General Motors v. Bua,
37 Ill.2d
180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
38
Bua at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 14 (1967).
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vancy, the trial court should require "some preliminary showing
of materiality and relevancy.18 Its finding, however, is not inconsistent with the new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214 31 which
provides that a party may be ordered to produce specified documents "relevant to the subject matter of the action." 0 As noted
by the Supreme Court Rules Committee, "[t]he words 'relevant to
the subject matter of the action' are substituted for the language
[found in former Rule 17, under which the Bua case was decided]
'relating to the merits of the matter in litigation' and 'relative
to the merits of the said matter'."' 41 The latter two clauses were
thought to limit the scope of discovery only to evidence itself
and not to material "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," as outlined in Federal Rule 26.42
However, since the language has not been construed in this restrictive fashion4 3 by the courts, the committee substituted the
words "relevant to the subject matter of the action" to conform
to the case law. Thus, the Bua case is not to be distinguished by
its holding as to the required standard of relevancy and materiality. These requirements were already embodied in existing
case law and unchallenged by Bua. The case is noteworthy because it requires a preliminary showing of relevancy and materiality where the relevance of the material sought to be discovered is not evident on the face of the pleadings.
The method suggested by the court to determine the relevancy and materiality of the documents is through the "judicious
use of interrogatories, ' ' 44 which is within the discretion of the
trial judge. The court is not here reinstating the use of interrogatories, generally, under the practice abolished by Monier v.
Chamberlain,'5 but is suggesting a plausible method of dealing
with a problem presented by the rule of that case. In other
words, in Monier, the court emphasized that "resort to interrogatories and discovery depositions is not a necessary condition precedent to a motion for discovery of material. ... -4 In
Bua, the court reiterated its statement in Monier, but stated that
interrogatories "may be required by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion where, as here, such prior use will substan39
4

1ILL. SUP. CT. R. 214, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11OA, §214 (1967).

0 Id.
41 Committee Comments on Rule 214, ILL. ANN.

STAT. ch. 110A, §214
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
See the Joint Committee Comments that accompanied (former) Rule 19-4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-4 (1965).
4 See Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 Ill.2d 400, 202 N.E.2d 15 (1964)
Monier v. Chamberlain, 66 Ill. App. 2d 472, 213 N.E.2d 425 (3d Dist. 1966);
People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 IlU.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) ; Krupp
v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
44
Bua at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
48 Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill.2d 351,221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
4 Id. at 355, 221 N.E.2d at 414.
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tially expedite identification of relevant material. ' '4 Thus, while
the court leaves the manner of determining the relevancy of
material sought to be discovered to the discretion of the trial
judge, where such material is not relevant on its face, a preliminary showing will be required before the granting of a production order.

With a "preliminary showing of "relevance" thus established
as a condition precedent to the discovery of voluminous records

whose relevancy was not apparent on the face of the pleadings,
the court next considered the contempt order.
THE CONTEMPT ORDER UNDER RULE

19-12 (3)

4

In reviewing the contempt order of the trial court, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that an order that authorizes the
47 Bua at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
A recent article, Harte, A Response
to Comment on People ex rel. General Motors v. Nicholas J. Bua, Judge,
48 CH. B. REc. 214 (1967), points out that:
Obviously in the vast majority of cases, . . . no showing other than the
motion itself will be necessary. In other, more complex cases, requiring
the production of voluminous documents of a varied nature on a much
greater scale (e.g., the typical anti-trust or trade infringement case),
where business interruption or trade secrets are involved, other discovery techniques may be necessary preliminarily to accommodate the
broad requirements of reasonable specificity and relevancy. General
Motors expressly leaves the utilization of this technique to the discretion of the trial judge.
Id. at 217. Cf. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
The Bua court also found that the two orders attacked in this proceeding were too broad. It characterized the first paragraph of the April 27
order as a "catch all demand for the production of documents without the
slightest degree of specificity." 37 Ill.2d at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
This finding is in accord with (former) Rule 17, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, §101.17 (1965), and new Rule 214 of the ILL. SuP. CT. R. See authority
cited note 39 supra. These rules provide that a party may be directed to
produce "specified documents" for inspection. Since paragraph 1 of the discovery order (see note 3 supra) did not specify the documents to be produced, it was stricken. The Bua court concluded that "[wlhile flexibility is
necessary in discovery, due process requires that production orders be sufficiently specific to inform a person of his obligation thereunder, especially
in light of the extreme sanctions available for a violation of such order." 37
Ill.2d at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 15. It is submitted that this finding should not
be deemed a limitation on the variety of types of documents which may be
discovered. However, it would appear that a proper enumeration is necessary.
48 Before proceeding, it must be noted that the contempt order issued
in this case was not of the traditional variety. The court in Bua stated:
We must concede that the June 29 order is cast in terms of a contempt proceeding, and that ordinarily such an adjudication is a final and
appealable order, and an appropriate method of testing pretrial discovery orders.
37 Ill.2d at 189, 226 N.E.2d at 12. But, the court continued:
[Wie are not convinced that the dichotomy of discovery sanctions established by Rule 19-12 (3) was intended to permit a trial court to render
an interlocutory order final and appealable merely by the use of contempt
language; The imposition of a fine or imprisonment as a sanction for
contempt is final and appealable because it is an original special proceeding, collateral to, and independent of, the case in which the contempt arises. . . . Such a sanction does not, as here, directly affect the
outcome of the principal action. Even though the order of June 29 is
cast in the language of contempt we conclude that the sanction imposed
achieves its validity by virtue of Rule 19-12(3) and since it determines
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striking of pleadings may do so only when the stricken pleadings bear some reasonable relationship to the information im49
properly withheld.

Historically, the Illinois courts have refused to recognize
that a trial court has inherent power to strike pleadings and enter default judgments as a punishment for contempt. 50 However, the cases in support of this position also hold that the courts
may accede to such power by legislative fiat.5 1 The Bua court
therefore concludes that since the legislature authorized it to

make rules governing discovery, 52 and since the court adopted
(former) Rule 19-12(3) 53 which provides for the sanction once
prohibited, the sanction imposed by the trial court was permissible.

However, the court then considered whether the sanction
imposed in the instant case was proper under the circumstances.
The court held that it was not 54 on the ground that the trial court

struck all General Motors' defenses, and not merely those defenses which were actually affected by the refusal to comply with
the discovery orders. In reaching its conclusion the court relied
on Caryl Richards Inc. v. Superior Court5 which considered the
presumptions that may arise when a party wrongfully with-

holds discovery of certain material. The California statute pursuant to which Ca'ryl was decided is substantially similar to our
supreme court rule. 56 The Caryl case distinguished the case of
liability in the principal case without a determination of damages it is
not yet final and appealable.
Id. at 191, 226 N.E.2d at 13. On the federal level, a contempt order entered against a person not a party to the litigation (e.g., an attorney) is
treated differently than an order entered against a party. The former are
considered final and appealable, since the contumacious party could not appeal
a final judgment in the case. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324
(1904); Fenton v. Walling, 139 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied.
321 U.S. 798 (1944).
49 Bua at 197, 226 N.E.2d at 16.
5 See Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897). The Hovey Court stated,
"The fundamental conception of a court of justice. is condemnation only
after hearing." Id. at 414. Thus, as the Bua court states, "a court possessing
plenary power to punish for contempt, may not, on the theory of punishing
for contempt, summarily deprive a party of all right to defend an action."
37 Ill.2d at 189, 226 N.E.2d at 12.
51Walter Cabinet Co. v. Russell, 250 Ill. 416, 95 N.E. 462 (1911)
Boettcher v.. Howard Engraving Co., 389 Ill. 75, 58 N.E.2d 866 (1945);
Peters v. Berkeley, 219 App. Div. 261, 219 N.Y.S. 709 (1927).
52

See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §3 (1967).

(Former) ILL. SuP. CT. R. 19-12(3) .(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§101.19-12(3) (1964)).
54 Bua at 197, 226 N.E.2d at 16.
15'188 Cal. App. 2d 300, 10 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1961).
56
53

CAL.

CODE OF

CIV. P. §2034(b) (2)

§§(I)-(IV)

(West 1954).

Com-

menting on this statute the court stated:
It provides in substance that if a party refuses to obey an order requiring
discovery, such as that made by the court here, 'the court may make
such orders in regard to the refusal as are just' (emphasis theirs) and
it then recites the sanctions that may be imposed. The first sanction specified is an order that the matter or fact concerning which an interroga-
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Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas57 on the ground that the
Arkansas statute operative in Hammond compelled that court
to strike the defendant's answer and enter judgment by default.
The effect of the Arkansas statute in Hammond was to create a
presumption that the evidence, if produced, would have proved
the plaintiff's cause of action and that the defenses interposed to
the complaint were without merit. The Caryl case, however,
held that the defendant's refusal to comply merely gave rise to
a presumption that the information withheld would prove the

element of plaintiff's cause of action for which it was sought,
and that it could not be the basis for a presumption that all of
the other essential facts alleged in the complaint were true or
that allegations by the defendant as to contributory negligence

58
were untrue.
A test for determining the extent to which a presumption

may be created by such statute or rule was set forth by the United

States Supreme Court in Tot v. United States,59 which held that a
statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there is no rational
connection in common experience between the fact to be proved
and the ultimate fact to be presumed, 6° stating:
This is not to say that a valid presumption may not be created upon
a view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific
case. But where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it
is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing
the procedure of courts.-'
tory is proposed shall be taken as established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; the
second sanction is an order which prohibits the disobedient party from
opposing a designated claim; the third sanction is an order striking out a
pleading and rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party.
188 Cal. App. 2d at 304, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
57212 U.S. 322 (1908).
The Hammond Court distinguished the Hovey
case, see note 50 sup'a, stating:
Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend as a mere punishment. This case [Hammond Packing] presents a failure by the defendant to produce what we must assume was material evidence in its
possession and a resulting striking out of an answer and a default. The
proceeding here taken may therefore find its sanction in the undoubted
right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the
bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from the suppression or
failure to produce the proof ordered, when such proof concerned the
rightful decision of the cause. In a sense, of course, the striking out of
the answer and default was a punishment, but it was only remotely
so, as the generating source of the power was the right to create a presumption flowing from the failure to produce.
Hammond at 350.
58 188 Cal. App. 2d at 307, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The Caryl case held
that where a defendant manufacturer refused to disclose in discovery the
exact formula for a hairdressing which allegedly injured plaintiff's eyes
when sprayed on in a beauty salon, the proper sanction should not have been
default, lbut merely an order that the dressing was such as might injure a
person's (es.
59319 U.S. 463 (1943).
60 Id. at 467.
61

Id. at 468.
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The Bua court specifically relied upon the reasoning of the Caryl
and Tot cases and accordingly held that, since in a products liability case, the records sought from General Motors could not
relate to the issue of contributory negligence or the issue of damages, the defendant's pleadings as to those issues should not have

been stricken.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY -

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

In reaching its conclusion that the trial court erred when
it struck the defense of contributory negligence pursuant to its

application of its contempt sanctions, the court in Bua briefly
considered whether contributory negligence remains a meritorious defense in a products liability case under the strict tort
liability doctrine enunciated in Suvada V. White Motors.62 The
opinion in Suvada failed to resolve this question,63 and the Bua
opinion raises much speculation as to whether it, by its brief
treatment of this issue, intended to fill a gap seemingly left by
64
the Suvada case. Thus far one court has so held.
It is submitted that the intention of the Bua court was not
to decide the issue of contributory negligence as applied to products liability cases.

The initial problem arises when one considers whether Su32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Discussing Suvada, the Bua
court stated:
This is a products liability case pleaded in two counts, one alleging
negligence, and the other alleging breach of warranty. In Suvada v.
62

White .

.

. this court adopted the theory which imposes strict tort lia-

bility on the manufacturer. Under that theory, negligence need not be
proved and a plaintiff has only to prove that his injury or damages
resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an
unusually dangerous one, and that the condition existed at the time
the product left the manufacturer's control. However, under both
counts it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff was in the exercise
of due care for his own safety. It is our view that a proper sanction
in such a case would be to strike any defenses of a recalcitrant defendant only on the issues affected by the refusal to comply with discovery orders. (emphasis added).
Bua at 196, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
63 In defining the manufacturer's liability, the Suvada court declared:
The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a
condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control.
32 Ill.2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. Further, at least one author has contended that Suvada expressly bars contributory negligence as a defense.
See Osmon, Products Liability under the Suvzda Theory, 55 ILL. B.J. 906
(1967).
64 In Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315,
229 N.E.2d 684 (1967), the court interpreted the language of Bua to state:
[F]reedom from contributory negligence'is an element to be proven, both
in products liability and warranty cases. Contributory negligence in a
products liability case may be properly an issue, for while it is said
that the plaintiff is not required to discover a defect, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence, on the other hand, if he discovers a defect, or if the danger in use is known to him and he proceeds to use it, he may be guilty of contributory negligence.
Id. at 331, 229 N.E.2d at 692.
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vada affected a substantive or procedural change in the law.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Fanning v. Lamay 5 treated Suvada as the case which created a new tort of strict liability in
Illinois. If Suvada is so treated, it can be said that its holding
amounts to a change in the substantive law; and if it does change
the substantive law, to apply it to the Bua case would involve
the retroactive application of substantive law announced in 1965
to a case filed in 1963.66 It is submitted that to do so is a matter
not without difficulty.
The complaint in Franklinv. General Motors,67 out of which
the Bua case arose, was filed in October 1963, while the decision
in Suvada v. White Motors68 was not decided until 1965. Nor
was the complaint in the Franklin case amended to include a
count based on strict liability.
Thus, to presume that the court in Bua attempted to apply
the Suvada doctrine would raise a serious conceptual problem.
It would be less precipitous to confine the court's treatment of
the contributory negligence question to the pre-Suvada law which
would appear to govern the Bua decision.
Moreover it is not entirely clear whether the court was
referring only to the negligence count or to both the negligence
and breach of warranty counts, when it characterized plaintiff's
freedom from contributory negligence as a proper defense,
while it would appear that the court was referring to both
counts.
Whether contributory negligence remains a valid defense
to a breach of warranty action after Suvada has been a subject
of controversy, and has resulted in two totally divergent views.
One side argues that combining the public policy upon which
the Suvada 9 case was grounded, namely that "public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the jistice of imposing the loss on the one
creating the risk and reaping the profit... -70 with "impressive
authority from foreign jurisdictions which supports the principle
65 38 Ill.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967). The court, referring to
Suvada, stated:

In deciding that the complaint stated a cause of action against the
manufacturer this court held that negligence is no longer necessary for
liability where an imminently dangerous product is concerned, and that

the concept of strict liability in tort is applicable not only in food cases
but to other products as well whose defective condition makes them
unreasonably dangerous to the user.

(emphasis added)

Id. at 211, 230 N.E.2d at 184.
66 Cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 148 N.E.2d 673 (1957) and cases

cited therein. See generally Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (1967).

See Abstract of Record at 2, People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v.
68 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
67

Bua, Complaint No. 63 C 22427 (1963).
69 Id.
0

7 Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
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that contributory negligence of the consumer or user is not a
defense to an action for breach of warranty express or implied"71
militates against holding contributory negligence to be a defense.
The argument on the opposite side is represented in such cases
as Brandenbergv. Weaver Mfg. Co. 72 wherein the court in allowing contributory negligence as a defense, stated:
If a plaintiff has available to him two different methods .. .and
he chooses the method or way which is unknown and unexplored or
known to involve certain possible hazards, and he is injured. in the
process, as he is contributorily negligent as a matter of law.... 73

With these divergent points of view in mind it is difficult to
imagine that the Illinois court would determine the applicability
of the concept of contributory negligence to this phase of tort liability without some direct, unequivocal statement to that effect.
Nevertheless, the issue of breach of warranty would appear
to have been present in the case from its inception, since the
original complaint did contain counts as to negligence and breach
of warranty that the automobile was reasonably fit for its intended use.7 4 If the court's words are to be ascribed any meaning whatsoever, this fact, together with the court's use of the
language, "both counts," 7 5 appears, at least, to require a plaintiff
to plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence in a
products liability case based on breach of warranty.
Even accepting this view, however, it must be remembered
that the reference to products liability appears only as support
for the principal holding that a trial court does not possess the
power to strike pleadings for violation of discovery orders which
are unrelated to the information withheld. Further, the question of products liability was never briefed or argued before the
court and is wholly collateral to the main issues of the case.76
Hence, it is submitted that this result, or a result that would require one to plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence in a strict liability situation, was not contemplated by the
Bua court.
71 Harte, A Response to Comment on People ex rel. General Motors v.
Nicholas J. Bua, Judge, 48 CHi. B. REC. 214, 217 (1967). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965).
However, note comment n:

On
sists in
danger,
defense

the other hand the form of contributory negligence which convoluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability.
7277 Ill. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966).
73 Id. at 378, 222 N.E.2d at 350.
74 See Abstract of Record at 7, People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua,
Complaint No. 63 C 22427 (1963). But see Harte, A Response to Comment
on People ex rel. General Motors v. Nicholas J. Bua, Judge, 48 CHI. B. REC.
214, 217 wherein the 'author states that breach of warranty was not present
in this case from its inception but was later added.
75Bua at 196, 226 N.E.2d at 16.
76 Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at 23, People ex rel, General
Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967), raises this important point.
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DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS

The Bua court appears to have finally disposed of the prob-

lem, at least in Illinois, of when a court may strike the pleadings
of a recalcitrant party. However, to strike a pleading because of
a failure to fully comply with a discovery order may be deemed a
denial of due process, where the failure to comply did not involve

bad faith. Such a problem is illustrated by Societe Internationale
v. Rogers.7 7 In that case, the United States Supreme Court was
petitioned to consider whether the federal district court properly
exercised its powers under Federal Rule 37(b) 78 in dismissing plaintiff's complaint despite a finding that it had acted in
good faith and made diligent efforts to execute a production order.7 9 The Supreme Court commenting on the Hovey8 ° and Hammond Packing", cases, stated:
These decisions establish that there are constitutional limitations
upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes,
to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for
a hearing on the merits of his cause.
S. *These two decisions leave
open the question whether Fifth
Amendment due process is violated by the striking of a complaint
because of a plaintiff's inability, despite
good-faith efforts, to com82
ply with a pretrial production order.

The Court then concluded:
In view of the findings in this case, [of a good-faith effort to
comply] ... and the serious constitutional questions we have noted,
we think that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with
a pretrial production order. . . .8
77 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
This rule is consistent with (former) ILL.
S. CT. R. 19-12(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-12(3) (1965). See Joint
Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §19-12(3) (Smith-Hurd
1965). Rule 19-12(3) is presently embodied in ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(c) (1967).
See Committee Comments on Rule
219(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, §219(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).

79 357 U.S. at 209 wherein the plaintiffs were specifically found not to
be in collusion with the Swiss Government to block the production of certain
records,
inspection of which were prohibited under Swiss law.
80
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
83 Hammond Packing v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1908).
82357 U.S. at 209-10. (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 212. Although Societe Internationale and the Bua case are
strikingly similar, it appears that before the doctrine of Societe Internationale can be invoked, there must be a finding of a good faith attempt to
comply. Although the Illinois Supreme Court in Bua did not make an express finding of bad faith, it did concede that the motives behind General
Motors' compliance "may be suspect". 37 Ill.2d at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court, on the same day that Bua was
adopted, reversed the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of
Strickler v. McCarthy, 37 Ill.2d 48, 224 N.E.2d 827 (1967). The appellate
court had held that where it appeared that evidence requested by a plaintiff
was material and not privileged against discovery and that the defendant's
refusal to disclose was contumacious and in bad faith, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by striking defendant's answer and entering judgment
against, him. In reversing, the supreme court found that the trial court
abused its discretion, noting that the parties were at odds as to the scope
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Thus, if the court in Bua had not found the methods of General
Motors' compliance somewhat "suspect," 84 fifth amendment due
process might well have prevented the striking of any of their
pleadings. While there are, as yet, few other cases in this area,85
Societe Internationale would appear to demand the result indicated.
CONCLUSION

The Bua case leaves many important questions unanswered.
However, the case, from its inception, did not lend itself to precise answers. The problems presented to the court ranged from
the good faith of the parties to the great expense and business
disruption which could have been caused by one ruling as opposed to another. In arriving at its decision, the court was confronted with the use of mandamus to appeal interlocutory orders,
the problems of relevancy and materiality relating to the production of complete records and, to a limited extent, the availability of contributory negligence as a defense in a products liability action. However, while the Buc case left unsolved some
major problems in the general area of discovery and products liability, it did effectively deal with the inequities presented by a
unique factual situation.
Karl W. Kristoff

of the discovery orders, and that even though plaintiff had reduced his de-

mands the defendant was left little time to produce the requested materials.
37 Ill.2d at 53, 224 N.E.2d at 830. Hence, it could be argued that where the
parties attempt to comply, but are in a good faith dispute as to the scope
of discovery orders, the doctrine of Societe Internationale could be invoked
to prevent the striking of their pleadings.
84

37 Ill.2d at 193, 226 N.E.2d at 15.

85 E.g., Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692

Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1962).

(D.C. Cir. 1966); Read v.

